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Scientists frequently disagree about what standards of proof or evidence to require for
accepting a theory dealing with unobservables such as strings (in today’s physics) or
atoms (in the physics of 100 years ago). The paper concerns the latter, and examines
why, on methodological grounds, atomic theory was so controversial among some
prominent physicists and chemists even past the first decade of the 20 th century. It
focuses on three figures: James Clerk Maxwell, who defended atomic physics;
Friedrich Wilhelm Ostwald, who initially rejected it in the 1890’s but changed his mind
by 1908 as a result of experiments with cathode rays and Brownian motion; and Pierre
Duhem, who vehemently rejected that theory until the day he died in 1916. Each of
these scientists defended his position in the light of strongly held methodological views
about what counts as empirical evidence or proof. I critically evaluate each of these
views.
Maxwell in 1875 proposed what he called a “method of physical speculation,” which is
a compromise between competing methodological views expressed by Whewell and
Mill. Like Whewell, appealing to “consilience” and “coherence,” it requires that the
theoretical hypotheses of atomic physics coherently explain and predict various types
of observable phenomena. But it goes beyond Whewellian conditions, and requires the
physicist to “deduce from the observed phenomena just as much information about
the conditions and connections of the [atomic system] as these phenomena can
furnish.” Maxwell seems to have in mind causal-inductive arguments to the existence
of atoms and their properties of a sort Mill demanded as the first of three steps in
what he (Mill) called the “deductive method,” viz. the inductive step to the existence of
the entities postulated and the laws governing them. However, while Mill calls for such
inductive arguments for each of the theoretical postulates, Maxwell does not. His line
is that if you can supply arguments for some of these, and if you can show how the
postulates introduced can furnish various explanations, you may have done enough to
show that the postulates should be accepted. Maxwell proceeds to give such
arguments for the molecular-kinetic theory, and claims to have thereby “justified the
hypothesis that a gas consists of molecules in motion” subject to the kinds of
dynamical assumptions he introduces.
Ostwald, Professor of Physical Chemistry at the University of Leipzig and 1909 winner
of the Nobel prize in chemistry, prior to 1908 was one of the most important critics of
atomism. In 1896 he published a paper entitled “Emancipation from Scientific
Materialism,” in which he spells out his objections to atomism and his defense of the
“energetical” view, as he puts it. Ostwald offers three main objections. One is that
mechanical theories, such as atomism is supposed to be, have not been altogether
successful in other domains (in optical theory, he mentions problems with both wave
and particle theories of light). Second, mechanical explanations allow reversibility of
processes – something not observed generally in the physical world. Third, and most
important from a methodological point of view, for Ostwald the aim of science is (as
he puts it) to “coordinate measurable quantities,” rather than to “picture” an
underlying reality that we are unable to measure. In 1896 Ostwald was demanding
that any entities introduced by a theory be measurable, and actually measured, in
order for that theory to be empirically confirmed. In 1908, in the preface to the third
edition of his textbook Outlines of General Chemistry, he claims to have been
converted by experiments of J.J. Thomson, that measured the ratio of mass to charge
of the electron, and of Jean Perrin, that measured Avogadro’s number by experiments
on Brownian motion. He considered his measurement requirement now satisfied, so
that he could conclude that “the atomic hypothesis is thus raised to the position of a
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scientifically well-founded theory.”
Duhem, like Ostwald prior to 1908, rejected atomism on philosophical, physical, and
historical grounds. For Duhem, writing in 1905, atomic theories are examples of
theories about an unobservable material world underlying observable phenomena.
Questions about such an underlying unobservable world, Duhem declared, “do not
have their source in experimental method, which is acquainted only with sensible
appearances and can discover nothing beyond them.” For him, the aim of physical
theory is not to discover realities underlying “sensible appearances,” but to provide a
highly abstract set of propositions that axiomatize and systematize laws that are
themselves abstracted from “sensible appearances” and allow new such laws to be
discovered. Duhem completely rejected atomic theory until he died in 1916, because it
postulates the existence of entities which, in his view, are unobservable. Even the
experiments of J.J. Thomson and Jean Perrin, of which he was aware, did not make
electrons or atoms observable. Although these experiments produced (alleged)
measurements of various “atomic” properties, the entities themselves remained
unobservable ones postulated to explain observable phenomena such as fluorescence
in the cathode tube and the Brownian motion of observable particles suspended in a
liquid. Duhem also rejected the theory because it lacked the kind of logical
systematization he sought.
In this paper, after setting out the scientific and methodological positions of the three
scientists, I argue for the following theses:
The dispute involving the three scientists reflected differences over what objective
methodological standards should be used in evaluating evidence for a theory
postulating atoms and molecules. Contrary to what some might claim, these scientists
did not propose their standards simply as personal choices among a set of legitimate
ones.
Ostwald’s measurement requirement and Duhem’s observability requirement are much
too strong to serve as necessary conditions of evidence or proof for postulated
entities. Although these scientists do not attempt to justify their basic methodological
demands, or at least do not succeed in doing so, in the paper I discuss what thoughts
might lie behind their claims, and I offer criticisms of these while looking at the
experiments of Thomson and Perrin, which converted Ostwald but not Duhem.
Maxwell’s “method of physical speculation”- the Millian-Whewellian compromise-
requires neither Ostwaldian measurements of the entity postulated, nor Duhemian
direct observation. However, the method is too weak to conclude that the postulated
entities exist, but, at best, that such a supposition is worth considering.
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